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 There’s long been a debate whether corporate governance law 
should require some duty to the public. The accepted wisdom is not to 
require such a duty—that corporate profit maximization provides jobs 
and other public benefits that exceed any harm. This is especially true, 
the argument goes, because imposing specific regulatory requirements 
and making certain actions illegal or tortious—what I’ll call “regulating 
substance,” in contrast to “regulating governance”—can mitigate the 
harm without unduly impairing corporate wealth production.   
 
 Whether that’s true in other contexts, I question if it’s true in the 
context of systemic economic harm. My examination is based in part 
on a forthcoming article1 and also parallels the efforts of a Working 
Group (which I chair) of Fellows of the American College of 
Bankruptcy, which is examining the same question under the laws of 
various nations worldwide. 
 
                                                 
1 Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 
1 (forthcoming Nov. 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2644375. 
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 Risk-Taking, Misalignment, and Systemic Harm   
 Excessive corporate risk-taking by systemically important firms 
is widely seen as one of the primary causes of the global financial 
crisis. In response, governments have issued an array of regulation to 
attempt to curb excessive risk-taking and prevent another crisis.  
 
 Many of these measures are designed to control excessive risk-
taking by aligning managerial and investor interests, implicitly 
assuming that the investors themselves would oppose excessively risky 
business ventures. These include, for example, requiring a systemically 
important firm to tie management compensation to the firm’s long-term 
performance, or requiring a systemically important firm to maintain so-
called contingent capital, in which debt securities convert into equity 
upon specified conditions. The assumption that investors themselves 
would oppose excessively risky business ventures is flawed, however. 
Therefore financial regulation based on the assumption’s validity is 
unreliable.  
 
 The assumption is flawed because what constitutes “excessive” 
risk-taking depends on the observer. Risk-taking is excessive from a 
given observer’s standpoint if it has a negative expected value to that 
observer—i.e., the expected costs to that observer exceed the expected 
benefits. It is reasonable to assume that investors would oppose risky 
business ventures with a negative expected value to them.  
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 The flaw, however, is that systemically important firms can 
engage in risk-taking ventures that have a positive expected value to 
their investors but a negative expected value to the public. That is 
because much of the systemic harm from such a firm’s failure would be 
externalized onto the public, including ordinary citizens impacted by an 
economic collapse, causing widespread poverty and unemployment. 
 
 Corporate governance law creates this misalignment by requiring 
managers of a firm to view the consequences of their firm’s actions, 
and thus the expected value of corporate risk-taking, only from the 
standpoint of the firm and its investors (effectively stakeholders). That 
perspective ignores externalities caused by the actions.  
 
 Ordinarily this is sensible; managers could not feasibly govern if 
they had to take into account the myriad small externalities that result 
from corporate risk-taking. But risk-taking that causes the failure of a 
systemically important firm could trigger a domino-like collapse of 
other firms or markets, causing systemic externalities that severely 
damage the economy.2   
 
 Regulating Substance may be Inherently Insufficient 
                                                 
2 I am not today engaging the broader question: When regulating substance is 
insufficient, should corporate governance law take into account other significant 
externalities, such as harm to public health and welfare, non-systemic economic harm, or 
climate change and other environmental harm? For analysis of that question, see Steven 
L. Schwarcz & Edward A. Peck, “Regulating Governance in the Public Interest” (draft on 
file with authors).   
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 There’s another reason, beyond the misalignment per se, why 
regulating substance may be inherently insufficient. Excessive 
corporate risk-taking is also tied to managerial judgment calls. For 
example, poor decisions, bad judgment, and greed contributed to the 
excessive corporate risk-taking that led to the financial crisis. To 
control that risk-taking, regulation should also regulate governance.   
 
 Others have recognized these limitations 
 There is now a consensus that existing regulatory measures, 
which primarily regulate substance, are inadequate. In a widely 
attended meeting in October at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, the 
New York Times reported that “policy makers have made little 
progress in figuring out how they might actually” prevent another 
financial crisis.3 Donald Kohn, former Vice Chair of the Federal 
Reserve Board, observed that the Fed “doesn’t really have the tools” to 
prevent another crisis. Luc Laeven, the European Central Bank Director 
General for Research, summarized the consensus reached at the 
conference: “Both monetary policy and macroprudential [regulatory] 
policy are not really very effective.” He then asked, “Do we have other 
policies?”    
 
                                                 
3 See Binyamin Appelbaum, Skepticism Prevails on Preventing Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
5, 2015, at B1. 
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 I believe we do have other policies, in the form of regulating 
governance. Consider how to redesign financial regulation to 
accomplish that. 
      
 
 I. REDESIGNING REGULATION 
 
 In making corporate decisions, managers currently have a duty to 
the firm and its investors. To reduce systemic externalities, they should 
also have a duty to society (a “public governance duty”) not to engage 
their firms in excessive risk-taking that leads to those externalities. So 
long as it does not unduly weaken wealth-producing capacity 
(corporate wealth production being in the public interest), regulating 
governance in this way would help to align private and public interests.  
 
 Regulating Governance Works Better also for Financial Change 
 In the financial context, regulating governance also has another 
advantage over regulating substance. Regulating substance often 
depends on regulators precisely understanding the financial 
“architecture”—the particular design and structure of financial firms, 
markets, and other related institutions—at the time the regulation is 
promulgated. Because the financial architecture is constantly changing, 
that type of grounded regulation has value as long as it is updated as 
needed to adapt to those changes.  
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 But ongoing financial monitoring and regulatory updating can be 
costly and is subject to political interference at each updating stage. As 
a result, financial regulation of substance usually lags financial 
innovation, causing unanticipated consequences and allowing 
innovations to escape regulatory scrutiny.4  
 
 Regulating governance, in contrast, can overcome that regulatory 
time lag. To fulfill their governance duties, the managers of a firm that 
is proposing to engage in a financially innovative but risky project must 
try to obtain the most current information about the innovation and its 
consequences.     
 
 II. TOWARDS REGULATORY ALIGNMENT: A PUBLIC 
GOVERNANCE DUTY 
 
 Next consider the theory and practicality of a public governance 
duty. Because only systemically important firms, by definition, could 
engage in risk-taking that leads to systemic externalities, such a duty 
should apply only to managers of those firms.    
 
 A. Situating a Public Governance Duty within Corporate     
 Governance Theory 
                                                 
4 This occurred in 2008, for example, when the pre-crisis financial regulatory framework, 
which assumed the dominance of bank-intermediated funding, failed to adequately 
address a collapsing financial system in which the majority of funding had become non-
bank intermediated. 
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 Except to the extent it intentionally limits shareholder primacy, a 
public governance duty would not be inconsistent with corporate 
governance legal theory. It should most clearly be consistent with the 
stakeholder model of governance, which considers the interests of 
everyone affected by a firm’s actions to avoid anyone being unfairly 
exploited. The public, of course, is affected by a firm’s risk-taking. 
This model, however, adds little explanatory value because there is 
fundamental disagreement on the extent to which non-investor 
stakeholder interests should be taken into account, valued, and balanced 
with shareholder interests.     
 
 A public governance duty would, at first glance, appear to be 
inconsistent with the contractarian model of governance—that a firm is 
a “nexus of contracts” among private parties. After all, members of the 
public are not contracting parties. Contract law, however, does not limit 
its application to contracting parties. Government should be able to 
limit freedom of contracting when the contracting causes externalities. 
The critical question is which externalities should count in limiting that 
freedom.  
 
 Even under contract law, there is no absolute answer to that 
question. But we need answer only a much more limited question: 
Should systemic externalities count in limiting freedom of contract? 
That question has already effectively been answered: systemic 
externalities not only harm the public, who cannot contract to protect 
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themselves, but also cause much more harm than non-systemic 
externalities, including widespread poverty and unemployment. These 
are exactly the type of externalities that should count in limiting 
freedom of contract.  
 
 A public governance duty would technically be inconsistent with 
the shareholder-primacy model. Proponents of shareholder primacy 
argue that managers of for-profit corporations should govern the firm 
solely for the best interests of its shareholders. They accept that firms 
can cause externalities, but they believe the efficient response is for 
government to regulate substance, without interfering with corporate 
governance. However, where regulating substance is insufficient, as in 
the case of controlling the excessive corporate risk-taking that causes 
systemic externalities, the alternative should be to regulate corporate 
governance.     
 
 Next consider a public governance duty’s practicality: how to 
regulate governance without unduly weakening corporate wealth-
producing capacity. 
 
 B. Practicality of a Public Governance Duty 
 Under a public governance duty, the managers of a systemically 
important firm would not only have a private corporate governance 
duty to the firm and its investors but also a duty not to engage in 
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excessive risk-taking that could systemically harm the public.5 That 
public duty raises several practical issues.  
 
 1. Legally Imposing the Duty.  How should a public governance 
duty be legally imposed? Courts, for example, could create such a duty 
through judicial decisions. Or legislatures could amend their 
corporation laws to require such a duty. The latter may be preferred 
because imposing such a duty broadly impacts public policy.    
 
 In the United States, for example, this would mean that a public 
governance duty should be imposed either by state legislatures 
(especially the Delaware legislature, because most domestic firms are 
incorporated under Delaware law) or by the U.S. Congress. Because 
corporation law in the United States is traditionally state, not federal, 
states ideally should take the lead in imposing such a duty.  
 
 It is questionable, however, whether state legislatures are well 
positioned to impose a public governance duty. Any given legislature 
would be unlikely to want to pioneer such a duty because it could 
                                                 
5 Cf. John Carney, Big-Bank Board Game Puts Shareholders in Second Place, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL, Apr. 5, 2015 (noting a speech by U.S. Federal Reserve Governor 
Daniel Tarullo suggesting that “corporate governance would need to change to broaden 
the scope of boards’ fiduciary duties to reflect macroprudential [i.e., systemic] regulatory 
objectives”). The nation of Iceland has actually enacted legislation that appears to 
require, at least in principle, the managers of at least certain systemically important firms 
to “operate[] [their firms] in the interests of . . . shareholders . . . and the entire national 
economy.” Ministry of Industries and Innovation, Act. No. 161/2002 on Financial 
Undertakings. 
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discourage firms from incorporating in its state. Furthermore, systemic 
risk is a national and international problem, not usually a local state 
problem. The “internalization principle” recognizes that regulatory 
responsibilities should generally be assigned to the unit of government 
that best internalizes the full costs of the underlying regulated activity. 
For these reasons, Congress may be best situated to impose a public 
governance duty.  
 
 2. Assessing and Balancing Costs and Benefits.  How should 
managers of a systemically important firm, or members of such a firm’s 
risk committee,6 assess and balance the public costs and private 
benefits of a risk-taking activity? Let’s examine and compare two 
approaches, one subjective and the other more objective and 
ministerial. On a case-by-case basis, managers could choose which 
approach to follow. Either approach would be needed only when 
deciding on a risky project whose failure might, either itself or in 
combination with other factors of which such managers are or should 
be aware,7 cause the firm to fail.8 
 
                                                 
6 Surprisingly, even risk committees required by the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States 
are not obligated, and indeed may have no legal authority, to consider risks to the public. 
7 Cf. John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 69 (2014) (observing that “it is surely the board’s 
responsibility to identify those risks which are of a magnitude and kind as to threaten the 
firm’s stability”). 
8 See earlier discussion observing that systemic externalities can result from risk-taking 
that causes the failure of a systemically important firm.  
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 Managers following a subjective approach would simply consider 
those costs and balance them against benefits—the same way they 
would consider and balance any other relevant costs and benefits when 
making a corporate governance decision. Their assessment and 
balancing might, but would not necessarily, be documented or 
explained. Managers may favor this approach because it would not 
change their current behavior.  
 
 This subjective approach would have at least three drawbacks, 
however. First, because the consequences of a systemic collapse can be 
devastating to the public, the decisionmaking process to mitigate that 
harm should be more transparent. Second, managers following a 
subjective approach may be subject to peer pressure to favor investor 
profitability over avoiding public harm—especially when, as I later 
argue, managers often have conflicts of interest that favor the firm’s 
shareholders over the public. Third, although courts generally try to 
avoid second-guessing management decisions, even managers should 
want to follow an approach that provides an explicit safe harbor against 
litigation—at least if the approach is relatively ministerial.      
 
 Consider how to craft a possible ministerial safe-harbor objective 
approach, using the generic example of a systemically important firm 
engaging in a risky project that could be profitable. The expected 
private benefits would be the expected value of the project to the firm’s 
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investors (usually the shareholders). The expected public costs would 
be the expected value of the project’s systemic costs.9    
 
 In large part, the firm’s managers should have sufficient 
information, or at least much more information than third parties, about 
these values. For example, managers should have much more 
information than third parties about valuing the chance of the project 
being successful, the value to investors from that success, the loss from 
the project’s failure, and the chance of the firm failing as a result of the 
project’s failure.   
 
 The exception, however, is valuing the systemic costs if the firm 
fails. That valuation should be a public policy choice. It might be 
based, for example, on the estimated cost of a government bailout to 
avoid a systemic failure. Such an estimate could be made by the 
government as part of the process of designating a firm as 
“systemically important,” and thereafter periodically updated by the 
government. 
 
 From a strict (Kaldor-Hicks) economic efficiency standpoint, the 
project would be efficient if its expected value to investors exceeds the 
expected value of its systemic costs. As a public policy matter, 
however, simple economic efficiency may be insufficient because the 
                                                 
9 In Misalignment, supra note 1, I examine in detail how these costs and benefits could be 
calculated. 
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magnitude and harmful consequences of a systemic collapse, if it 
occurs, could be devastating.  
 
 When balancing the costs and benefits of activities that might 
pose great harm, policymakers normally apply a precautionary 
principle directing regulators to err on the side of safety. Applying that 
to our balancing, it may be appropriate (as Cass Sunstein has proposed 
in another context10) to require “a margin of safety”—for example, 
requiring that the expected value to investors considerably exceeds the 
expected value of systemic costs—to demonstrate that a given risk-
taking activity is justified.   
 
 I’m not claiming that the foregoing approach to assessing and 
balancing costs and benefits is perfect. Even if imperfect, however, it 
should represent a step towards shaping corporate governance norms to 
begin to take the public into account.  
 
 3. Enforcing a Public Governance Duty.  Who should enforce a 
public governance duty? Under existing corporate governance law, 
shareholder derivative suits are the primary enforcement mechanism. 
Shareholders would have no interest, however, in suing managers of 
                                                 
10 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 UNIVERSITY OF 
PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1003, 1014 (2003) (discussing a form of the precautionary 
principle under which “regulation should include a margin of safety”). 
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their firm for externalizing systemic harm. Therefore, the government, 
by default, at least should have the right to enforce the public duty. 
 
 The government itself may be unable to effectively monitor a 
firm’s internal compliance with the public governance duty until the 
firm fails, when systemic consequences may be irremediable. To 
facilitate better monitoring, regulation implementing a public 
governance duty should include whistleblower incentives, including 
anti-retaliation protection for managers or others involved in the risk 
assessment who inform government officials of their firm’s 
noncompliance and possibly also monetary rewards. Regulation 
implementing a public governance duty might even impose an 
obligation on managers involved in the risk assessment to inform 
government officials of their firm’s noncompliance.   
 
 Another way to facilitate better monitoring, and more specifically 
enforcement, of the public governance duty would be to incentivize 
members of the public themselves. One such precedent is so-called qui 
tam suits under which private citizens can sue alleged defrauders in the 
name of the government. If the suit is successful or settled, the citizen-
plaintiff is entitled to a percentage of the award or settlement.  
 
 4. Business Judgment Rule as a Defense.  A critical issue 
concerns the business judgment rule as a defense to manager liability. 
In the traditional corporate governance context, managerial risk-taking 
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decisions are protected to some extent by this rule, which presumes that 
managers should not be personally liable for harm caused by negligent 
decisions made in good faith and without conflicts of interest—and in 
some articulations of the business judgment rule, also without gross 
negligence. The rule attempts to balance the goal of protecting 
investors against losses against the goals of encouraging the best 
managers to serve and avoiding the exercise of inappropriate judicial 
discretion (as would occur if courts tried to second-guess business 
judgments).  
 
 The business judgment rule arguably should apply differently in a 
public-governance-duty context because one of the rule’s basic 
assumptions—that there be no conflict of interest—may be breached. 
The interest of a manager who holds significant shares or interests in 
shares, or whose compensation or retention is dependent on share price, 
is aligned with the firm’s shareholders, not with that of the public. To 
that extent, the manager would have a conflict of interest.   
 
 But how should the business judgment rule be modified without 
requiring courts to exercise inappropriate discretion or discouraging the 
best people from serving as managers? One approach would be to 
prevent conflicted managers who are grossly negligent—that is, who 
fail to use even slight care in assessing systemic harm to the public—
from using the rule as a defense.  
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 Technically, this modification merely applies the gross 
negligence standard that is often articulated as part of the business 
judgment rule, though rarely utilized with any rigor. Because courts 
routinely review whether other types of actions are grossly negligent, 
they should not find it “inappropriate” or impractical to review 
corporate risk-taking actions under a gross negligence standard. As a 
practical matter, managers who follow a reasonable procedure to 
balance public costs and private benefits should be protected. That 
would effectively conform the business judgment rule’s public-
governance-duty application to a duty of process care, a standard 
commonly used.11   
 
 5. To What Extent Should Managers be Protected Under D&O 
Liability Insurance?  Another issue is the extent to which managers 
who become subject to liability for breaching the public governance 
duty should be protected under directors and officers (“D&O”) liability 
                                                 
11 The requirement that managers use at least slight care in assessing systemic harm to the 
public would also be consistent with the business judgment rule’s actual application in at 
least some jurisdictions that do not formally articulate a gross negligence standard as part 
of the rule. Delaware, for example, disallows business-judgment-rule protection for 
managers who act in “bad faith.” See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 
A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005) (explaining that “[t]he presumption of the business 
judgment rule creates a presumption that a director acted in good faith” and that “[t]he 
good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes . . . duties of care and loyalty”). Bad 
faith is broadly defined as including conduct that “is known to constitute a violation of 
applicable positive law.” Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del. 
Ch. 1996) (emphasis in original). Such conduct is interpreted to include a manager failing 
to take “steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy” such a violation. In re 
Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). A 
manager’s failure to use even slight care when assessing systemic harm to the public 
under a legally mandated public governance duty would appear to be bad faith under 
those interpretations 
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insurance, which indemnifies managers against personal liability. 
Although D&O liability insurance is needed to incentivize good 
managers and also to help ensure that sufficient funds are available to 
properly incentivize private-action lawsuits, it might compromise the 
deterrent effect of imposing personal liability. Furthermore, because the 
magnitude of systemic harm is open ended, insurers may be reluctant to 
offer D&O insurance covering breaches of the public governance duty. 
At least one possible solution to these concerns would be to specify a 
limit on the amount of the claim that could be imposed for breaching 
the public governance duty and, like a deductible, to require managers 




 I have argued that corporate governance law should require some 
duty to the public in order to help mitigate systemic economic harm. 
Even if imperfect, such a duty represents (as mentioned) an important 
step towards shaping corporate governance norms to begin to take the 
public into account.  
  
